The short answer is that the European public would react badly to any “Growth First” agenda premised on welfare retrenchment — but the more interesting question is which publics, and on what timeline — because Europe is not a monolith, and the political economy of welfare retrenchment plays out very differently depending on where you are standing. The historical record on this is fairly unambiguous. Every serious attempt to structurally trim European welfare states — Schröder’s Agenda 2010, Sarkozy’s pension reforms, the austerity packages imposed on Greece, Portugal, and Spain after 2010 — generated fierce political backlash, often with lasting consequences.

Since the outbreak of the current Iran-Israel conflict on February 28, 2026, Iranian forces have repeatedly deployed cluster munitions against populated centers inside Israel. The weapon’s mechanics are straightforward and its legal status is not: a ballistic missile releases its warhead in flight, dispersing dozens of unguided submunitions across an area up to thirteen kilometers wide. That dispersal pattern is incompatible with the foundational rule of distinction — the obligation under international humanitarian law to separate combatants from civilians before pulling the trigger.

Time is the real battlefield here. That is the core of the argument, and once you see it that way, a lot of Iran’s behavior starts to look less reactive and more deliberate. Iran does not need to defeat the United States in a conventional military sense to achieve a strategic result. It needs to drag the confrontation into a shape that the United States, and especially Donald Trump, finds politically, psychologically, and economically unsustainable.

Pam Bondi is out as Attorney General. Randy George, the Army Chief of Staff, has been dismissed. Now The Atlantic reports active discussions inside the administration about firing FBI Director Kash Patel, Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, and Labor Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer. So: is it a purge? Call it what it is. A purge is not defined by the politics of the victims — it is defined by the velocity, the opacity, and the logic of elimination.

For decades, U.S. Treasury securities commanded a pricing premium that economists call the convenience yield — the extra return investors were willing to forgo in exchange for holding the world’s most liquid, safest, most universally accepted collateral. That premium is eroding. The GAO’s March 2026 federal debt management report (GAO-26-107529) treats this as a structural shift, not a market fluctuation, and the data support that reading. The convenience yield is not directly observable.

The debt limit is, in strict operational terms, a fiction. Congress authorizes spending through the appropriations process. It authorizes revenue through the tax code. The debt that results from the gap between those two is mathematically determined. The debt limit then arrives as a third act — a separate legislative mechanism that can block Treasury from issuing the securities needed to pay obligations Congress has already created. It does not constrain spending.

The Wall Street Journal reported Monday that President Trump has told aides he is prepared to wind down the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran while leaving the Strait of Hormuz largely closed — deferring what he views as an operationally complex reopening mission to a later phase, or to allies. The calculation is blunt: forcing the strait open would push the conflict past his stated four-to-six-week timeline, and Trump has decided that isn’t a price he’s willing to pay.

The deployment of thousands of additional U.S. Marines into the Middle East is being framed as a deterrent measure, a stabilizing move intended to prevent further escalation. That framing, while technically correct, obscures a more consequential shift already underway. What is emerging is not a static posture designed to hold the line, but a dynamic configuration of forces that lowers the barrier to action. Deterrence, in this context, is blending into operational momentum.

There is a particular kind of strategic failure that is almost admirable in its consistency. Iran, in the weeks since February 28, has managed to accomplish what years of American diplomacy could not: convincing a fractured, mutually suspicious Middle East that it has a common enemy. It has done so not through miscalculation at the margins, but through a sustained, multi-front campaign that has struck neutrals, allies, and American assets with equal indifference.

The tone coming out of Washington is shifting, and not in a subtle way. A group of Democratic members on the House Armed Services Committee, led by Congressman John Garamendi, is openly pressing for immediate public testimony from the Department of Defense regarding the ongoing U.S. military actions tied to Iran. The request, directed to committee chairman Mike Rogers, signals growing unease not just about the conflict itself, but about how little clarity Congress feels it has over its scope, objectives, and trajectory.