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    <title>political economy on Policymaker.net</title>
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      <title>The European Welfare Trap: What &#39;Growth First&#39; Would Actually Cost</title>
      <link>https://policymaker.net/2026/04/08/europe-growth-first-welfare-trap/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
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      <description>The short answer is that the European public would react badly to any &amp;ldquo;Growth First&amp;rdquo; agenda premised on welfare retrenchment — but the more interesting question is which publics, and on what timeline — because Europe is not a monolith, and the political economy of welfare retrenchment plays out very differently depending on where you are standing.
The historical record on this is fairly unambiguous. Every serious attempt to structurally trim European welfare states — Schröder&amp;rsquo;s Agenda 2010, Sarkozy&amp;rsquo;s pension reforms, the austerity packages imposed on Greece, Portugal, and Spain after 2010 — generated fierce political backlash, often with lasting consequences.</description>
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